Introduction
The French welfare system is often described as one of the most 'immovable objects' (Pierson, 1998: 558) among welfare states or as part of the 'frozen continental landscape ' (Esping-Andersen, 1996) . The prevalence of social insurance mechanisms in the administration of French social protection typically constrains the scope of welfare retrenchment at times of rising financial and ideological pressures on social security systems. Trade unions represent crucial veto players as they defend the rights of their clientele, thus accentuating political and ideological pressures on non-insured job seekers, especially minimum income recipients. However, institutional veto points do not alone account for the ability of French society to resist change. 1 Indeed, French political elites are divided on how to reform the social protection system. Even when political constraints are relatively weak, there is no technocratic agreement in relation to the 'best solution'. Internal division is particularly accentuated among French Socialists, but is also pronounced within the current right-wing government. In this context, reform trajectories remain erratic and incremental. Governments implement institutional change through successive layering, that is by adding successive reforms and legislative programmes rather than replacing new ones (Palier, 2005) .
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a logic of creeping activation if not workfare at the margins of the labour force. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a move towards the activation of passive expenditure for the unemployed (both insured and non-insured). In particular, there is a rising consensus according to which one of the main causes of welfare dependency is that low-paid jobs are not financially attractive in comparison to social assistance and unemployment benefits. This analysis has led to the implementation of 'make work pay' policies, coupled with an attempt to make benefit receipt more conditional on evidence of job search. These policies promote employability instead of simply managing social exclusion through the promotion of occupational welfare. French ALMPs attempt to raise employment levels by implementing job-sharing policies (the policies of working-hoursreduction) as well as wage moderation. They have taken a new workfarist turn as they attempt to push the inactive and the long-term unemployed back into some form of paid employment. Such measures are primarily targeted at social assistance recipients, notably beneficiaries of the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, the RMI. Whereas governments find it politically difficult to 'activate on the cheap' various professional categories who are at least symbolically represented by the trade unions, they encounter less difficulties in implementing workfare measures targeted at the most vulnerable sections of the labour force, such as the youth, women and the long-term unemployed. This is the strategy pursued by the current right-wing government, with its effort to rehabilitate the French 'work ethic'. This turn towards activation was originally initiated by the socialist government of Lionel jospin in 1997-2002. The current governmental discourse contains both neo-populist and paternalist components. However, I argue that the attempt to implement workfarist policies is mitigated by several constraints. First, there is no single coherent policy agenda advocated by influential policy communities. Rather, the agenda-making process is extremely fluid, characterised by a constant flow of proposals. But no policy direction or coherent proposal has yet imposed itself in the policy stream. The only commonly shared proposition is that the welfare system does not produce enough incentives to take up a low-paid job. Second, workfarism is theoretically incompatible with the French tradition of solidarity, whereby society has a collective duty towards its weakest citizens. As a result, political reform is implemented in an adversarial climate. Policy change is the product of a succession of incremental reforms which generate new problems as they add to the complexity of an already extremely fragmented system.
The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I analyse how the establishment of a dual system of social protection accentuated the divide between insiders and outsiders, with the tacit acceptance of social partners. In the second section, I show how the dual system of unemployment protection led to the emergence of activation policies
